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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Dwight Henley appeals an order of the District Court 
denying his motion to suppress evidence. Henley preserved his 
right to appeal that issue by entering conditional guilty pleas to 
possessing a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1) and possession with intent to distribute marijuana 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The question presented 
is whether the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania violated 
Henley’s Fourth Amendment rights when it searched his house 
while he was on parole. Because reasonable suspicion 




In March 2012, Henley was a parolee subject to 
supervision by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and 
Parole. A parole agent with over twenty years’ experience, 
Joyce Douglass, was assigned to Henley. According to Agent 
Douglass, Henley first did “really well” on parole while living 
with his sister in a supportive environment, App. II 109, and 
Douglass had a “pretty decent relationship” with him. App. II 
111. But Douglass observed a “change in attitude” as Henley 
“became more secretive” and engaged in conduct that led 
Douglass to ask her supervisor to search Henley and his home 
for evidence of drug trafficking. App. II 111. 
For starters, Douglass noticed Henley began associating 
with several former and current parolees suspected of drug 
dealing. Henley also violated his parole conditions by moving 
residences twice without the required prior notice. He moved 
out of his sister’s home and into a home on Pine Alley in 
Clairton, Pennsylvania, that he reportedly bought for $1.00 
from his brother Quienty, who was on parole as well. Henley 
later moved to a home on Park Avenue in Clairton he bought 
after reportedly selling the Pine Alley home for $800.00 to 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
review de novo the District Court’s legal determination that 
reasonable suspicion supported the search. Ornelas v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996). Because the suppression 
motion was denied, we view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Government. United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 





Jarron Bell, who himself was a parolee supervised by Douglass 
and was under investigation by the FBI for heroin trafficking. 
Douglass learned Henley was associating with Bell when she 
tried to visit Henley at the Pine Alley address, but was greeted 
by Bell, who pretended to be a guest even though he had 
bought the home from Henley. Henley admitted lying to 
Douglass about the property transfer to cover for Bell. 
Douglass’s observations on other home visits likewise 
sparked concern. She observed motorcycle club attire and a 
photograph of Henley with the club, whose members included 
other parolees. She caught Henley in more lies and another 
violation of parole conditions. In late spring 2013, Agent 
Douglass twice attempted a home visit, but Henley had 
traveled without permission to the club’s bike week at the 
beach. Henley falsely reported that he had gone fishing just 
outside the permitted area. In response, Douglass placed him 
on electronic monitoring for a month. On a March 2014 home 
visit, Douglass noticed Henley’s front door had been kicked in. 
Henley informed her someone broke into his home, which 
raised a red flag because it suggested to Douglass that someone 
was looking for drugs, guns, or money. Finally, during an 
October 31, 2014 home visit, Douglass smelled the “really 
strong” odor of a “large amount of marijuana,” which she 
called “skunk weed,” coming from the enclosed porch. App. II 
137-139.  
Another issue that troubled Douglass was Henley’s 
apparent income in relation to his lawful employment. At the 
beginning of his parole, Henley changed employers twice, 
increasing his wage to $11.00 per hour at MPW Industrial 
Services. According to his boss, Henley “work[ed] as much 
overtime as he possibly could,” App. II 121, “trying to better 
himself.” App. II 110. But MPW later reported to Douglass that 
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Henley chose to work less, rejecting available work he sought 
before and “all of a sudden, he just seemed to be working a 
couple days a week.” App. II 121. Despite this reduced 
schedule, Henley paid several thousand dollars in fines, when 
previously he had paid little. Douglass also took notice that: 
(1) Henley owned three motor vehicles, a motorcycle, and a 
boat; (2) Henley appeared at the parole offices with a “fair 
amount of cash,” though not enough in her estimation to 
document, App. II 191; and (3) “quite a bit of money” was 
spent to remodel and furnish Henley’s Park Avenue home. 
App. II 132. 
In late December 2014, MPW terminated Henley’s 
employment because he punched a co-worker, and multiple 
sources reported to Douglass that Henley’s brother Quienty 
brought a handgun to the altercation. Yet Henley told Douglass 
that his employer fired him because he accidentally ate a 
marijuana brownie and failed a drug test. 
From October 2013 until early 2015, Douglass received 
reports that Henley was selling marijuana, that he was paying 
his subordinates with heroin, and that his associates, (including 
Bell) were selling drugs. 
On February 23, 2015, after receiving approval from her 
supervisor, Douglass and two other Pennsylvania parole agents 
(John Sartori, Jr. and Ronald Fine) entered Henley’s home 
through an open door without a warrant, searched his person, 
and searched his residence. Officers found and seized the 
following indicia of drug trafficking: over $2,000 in cash; over 
800 grams of marijuana in a large plastic bag, a vacuum-sealed 
package, and several individual packages; scales; a marijuana 
grinder; a .45 caliber pistol and ammunition; and three cell 
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phones. During the search, Henley made incriminating 
statements as well. 
A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment 
charging Henley with drug trafficking and firearm offenses. 
Henley moved under Rule 12(b)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure to suppress the evidence obtained from the 
search, contending it violated the Fourth Amendment. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion, 
holding the agents possessed reasonable suspicion necessary to 
support the search. Consistent with his conditional guilty pleas, 
Henley filed this appeal challenging the search. 
II 
Henley claims Douglass’s suspicion that he was dealing 
drugs rested on “nothing more than stale speculation premised 
upon irrelevant innuendo.” Henley Br. at 5. In support of his 
appeal, Henley relies on various Pennsylvania court decisions 
concerned with state constitutional violations. Because this 
case involves a federal prosecution, however, we must 
determine what the Fourth Amendment demands of the 
challenged search. United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 363-
64 (3d Cir. 1984). At the same time, we recognize that state 
law may inform the contours of the government intrusion, both 
in terms of the legitimate state interests and the parolee’s 
diminished expectation of privacy. See Samson v. California, 
547 U.S. 843, 851–52 (2006).  
A 
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness, so we determine the constitutionality of a 
search “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it 
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intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112, 118–19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 300 (1999)).  
As a parolee, Henley’s liberty was subject to certain 
restrictions. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850–51 & n.2 (parolees 
are more like prisoners than probationers). The state interest in 
parolees like Henley is two-fold: (1) that they successfully 
complete the term of . . . parole with integration “back into the 
community” while (2) protecting the public from their conduct 
as individuals who are considered more likely to engage in 
criminal conduct than the ordinary member of the community. 
Id. at 849. “[T]he balance of these considerations requires no 
more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a [warrantless] 
search of a [parolee’s] . . . house.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 121; 
see United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438, 444 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(justification applies with perhaps even greater force to 
parolees given judgment that parolee needed incarceration). 
B 
Henley claims the applicable standard for the search is 
reasonable suspicion. The Government counters that under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Samson, the Fourth Amendment 
requires no suspicion to justify a warrantless parole search, 
even if Pennsylvania law would. We read Samson differently 
than the Government. 
Before Samson, the Supreme Court in Knights held 
constitutional the warrantless search of a probationer on 
reasonable suspicion where the search was a condition of 
probation of which the probationer was aware. 534 U.S. at 121. 
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In Samson, the Supreme Court considered the California 
legislature’s determination that it was not feasible to require 
reasonable suspicion to search parolees because of their vast 
numbers and high recidivism rates. California concluded that a 
reasonable suspicion requirement “would undermine the 
State’s ability to effectively supervise parolees and protect the 
public from criminal acts of reoffenders.” 547 U.S. at 854. 
Samson answered in the affirmative a question left open 
in Knight—“whether a condition of release can so diminish or 
eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement 
officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 
547 U.S. at 847 (emphasis added). The Samson Court upheld 
California’s decision to impose as a condition of parole that the 
individual be subject to search “by a parole officer or other 
peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a 
search warrant and with or without cause.” 547 U.S. at 846 
(citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000)). So Samson 
suggests that a State may make such a condition part of its 
parole system without violating the Fourth Amendment. 547 
U.S. at 855 (“That some States and the Federal Government 
require a level of individualized suspicion is of little relevance 
to our determination whether California’s supervisory system 
is drawn to meet its needs and is reasonable, taking into 
account a parolee’s substantially diminished expectation of 
privacy.”). Our reading of Samson and a faithful reading of our 
decision in United States v. Baker requires that we reject the 
Government’s proposition. 
Unlike in Samson, here neither the Pennsylvania 
legislature nor Henley’s conditions of release subject him to 
search at any time or for any reason. In fact, reasonable 
suspicion is required under Pennsylvania law. 61 PA. CONS. 
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STAT. § 6153.2 For that reason, in United States v. Baker, we 
held that although a Pennsylvania parolee consent form 
providing for search without a warrant waived the warrant 
requirement, it did not provide for suspicionless searches. 221 
F.3d at 448. We determined the search in Baker violated the 
Fourth Amendment because it was unsupported by reasonable 
suspicion or a waiver of Pennsylvania’s reasonable suspicion 
requirement for a parole search. Id. at 449. Baker accords with 
Samson, so we adhere to it. In sum, Henley’s search required 
reasonable suspicion because neither a statute nor a condition 
of parole provides that he was subject to search without 
suspicion. 
III 
We turn now to apply the “flexible” test of 
reasonableness. United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 309 (3d 
Cir. 2006). “Balancing the totality of the circumstances is the 
‘general Fourth Amendment approach’ used to assess the 
reasonableness of a contested search.” United States v. 
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 403 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Knights, 
534 U.S. at 118). We determine whether reasonable suspicion 
exists by context and “commonsense,” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
U.S. 119, 125 (2000), mindful that it is something less than 
what is “required to establish probable cause, but also in the 
sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that 
is less reliable,” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
Thus, an officer needs only “a particularized and objective 
                                                 
2 Section 6153(b), PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (2009), 
provides for search of parolees in accordance with its 
provisions. Section 6153(d) provides a parole agent may 
conduct a personal or property search on reasonable suspicion. 
61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6153(d)(1)-(2). 
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basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing,” United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).  
Parole agents, like other law enforcement officers, 
should “draw on their own experience and specialized training 
to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative 
information available to them that ‘might well elude an 
untrained person.’” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). In the comparable 
probation context, the Supreme Court has explained that 
we deal with a situation in which there is an 
ongoing supervisory relationship—and one that 
is not, or at least not entirely, adversarial—
between the object of the search and the 
decisionmaker. 
In such circumstances it is both 
unrealistic and destructive of the whole object of 
the continuing [] relationship to insist upon the 
same degree of demonstrable reliability of 
particular items of supporting data, and upon the 
same degree of certainty of violation, as is 
required in other contexts. In some cases—
especially those involving drugs or illegal 
weapons—the [] agency must be able to act 
based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the 
Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in 
order to intervene before [the individual] does 
damage to himself or society. The agency, 
moreover, must be able to proceed on the basis 
of its entire experience with the probationer, and 
to assess probabilities in the light of its 





Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987) (footnotes 
omitted).3  
In this appeal, we must determine whether the facts and 
circumstances known to a veteran parole agent who supervised 
a parolee convicted of drug crimes would warrant an agent of 
reasonable caution to have a particularized basis for believing 
evidence of criminality would be found during the February 
23, 2015 search. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. We hold they would. 
In response to the Government’s argument, Henley 
challenges information in isolation. We address each of 
Henley’s challenges, but we do so by considering (as we must) 
the totality of the circumstances. 
Henley first insists that the conduct Douglass cited in 
support of her belief he had returned to drug dealing was 
susceptible to innocuous explanation. According to Henley, the 
fact that he owned multiple vehicles and a boat, bought and 
sold houses, and suddenly came up with thousands of dollars 
while turning away lawful work should not have raised 
concerns to Douglass. Henley suggests that he might have sold 
a vehicle before buying the next one, the boat was nothing 
impressive, and the houses were of modest value (apparently 
worth only $1). His association with the motorcycle club was 
                                                 
3 In this same vein, Pennsylvania law provides for the 
supervisory agent/parolee relationship that “[s]upervision 
practices shall reflect the balance of enforcement of the 
conditions of parole and case management techniques to 
maximize successful parole completion through effective 




a positive thing that should have been of no concern to 
Douglass—despite the involvement of other parolees 
suspected of drug crimes. And how could Douglass hold 
against him his having paid the fines he was legally obliged to 
pay?  
Henley’s approach would replace “reasonable 
suspicion” based on the totality of the circumstances with a “no 
room for doubt” that a parolee is engaged in criminal conduct 
standard. Such a test would severely impede the laudable and 
legitimate goals of parole supervision: successful re-entry and 
protecting the public. Evaluating factors in isolation and then 
according “no weight” to conduct susceptible of “innocent 
explanation” departs “sharply” from the Supreme Court’s 
teachings. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. The Court has stated that 
“innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a 
showing of probable cause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
243 n.13 (1983). Even more so for the lesser showing of 
reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
1, 8-9 (1989) (conduct consistent with innocent travel in 
combination amounted to reasonable suspicion of a drug 
enforcement officer). For that reason, Douglass did not have to 
“rule out the possibility of innocent conduct,” Arvizu, 534 U.S. 
at 277, when considering Henley’s activities.  
And then there is Henley’s access to marijuana and its 
discovery at his home during a search for evidence of drug 
trafficking. Henley incredibly claims that his veteran parole 
agent failed to show she had experience to determine whether 
what she smelled on the home visit in October 2014 was 
marijuana, or if the smell was just a skunk infestation. 
Douglass’s experience supervising parolees convicted of drug 
crimes easily meets the bar for our evaluation of her 
assessment. Moreover, “[i]t is well settled that the smell of 
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marijuana alone, if articulable and particularized, may 
establish not merely reasonable suspicion, but probable cause.” 
Ramos, 443 F.3d at 308.  
Henley challenges as too stale to support reasonable 
suspicion for the February 23, 2015 search that (1) he suffered 
a break-in back in March 2014 and (2) Douglass detected the 
marijuana odor in October 2014. He protests (ironically) that 
his circumstances did not involve “the hallmarks of an actual 
investigation into narcotics dealing” because there were no 
drug buys or wiretaps. Henley Br. at 11. We reject the notion 
that absent a full-scale or ongoing drug trafficking 
investigation, staleness presents an insurmountable bar to a 
later parole search.  
As for staleness, “[t]he likelihood that the evidence 
sought is still in place depends on a number of variables, such 
as the nature of the crime [or parole violation], of the criminal, 
of the thing to be seized, and of the place to be searched,” 
United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d Cir. 1983); see 
United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1322 (3d Cir. 1993). The 
passage of time “loses significance” when the evidence sought 
relates to protracted or ongoing criminality. United States v. 
Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 774 (3d Cir. 2005); see Tehfe, 722 F.3d 
at 1119. 
United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2005), is 
instructive. That case involved aerial observation and seizure 
of marijuana plants at a property plus two anonymous tips over 
seven months later reporting marijuana growing there. We 
found that evidence provided probable cause to get a warrant 
to search the property despite the time between the observation 
and the tips. Id. at 262-63. Considering only the October 2014 
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home visit and the February search, the gap in this appeal is 
half the time at issue in Ritter. 
Henley also questions that no property search occurred 
at the time of the October 2014 home visit. But justification for 
an earlier search that did not occur does not vitiate lawful 
justification to conduct a later search. Moreover, any claimed 
staleness disappeared in the face of the broader circumstances 
giving Douglass reason to believe that Henley was trafficking 
drugs.  
As to the ongoing reports of criminal activity to his 
parole officer, Henley challenges them as unworthy of 
consideration because Douglass did not detail the who, what, 
where, and when of the reports. We disagree.  
It’s true Douglass provided little detail, but she did 
testify that reports were ongoing. She also said the reports were 
about Henley, not just someone consistent with his identity. 
And they specified he was selling drugs and paying 
subordinates with heroin.  
“Tipster” cases, whether involving probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion determinations, focus on the tip’s indicia 
of reliability. Alabama v. White found an anonymous tip 
reliable enough for a Terry stop where portions of the tip were 
corroborated, such as the unpredictable movements of the 
person identified in it. 496 U.S. at 327. We require more for 
the tip relied on by law enforcement to justify probable cause, 
than for reasonable suspicion. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 
330. And under the instruction of Griffin and Samson, the 
requisite reliability of a tip to support the weight of reasonable 
suspicion for a Terry stop seems too high a bar when 
considering the potentially recalcitrant parolee and a parole 
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search. Our approach to the reasonableness of a parole agent 
relying on information relayed by others, even if not law 
enforcement, even if anonymous, and even if not intrinsically 
reliable, bends heavily towards the twin goals of parole 
supervision with reasonableness of the intrusion as the 
paramount concern.  
In considering the inherent nature of supervision, we 
acknowledge that parole officers may consider general reports 
in carrying out their duties—in fact, that information is their 
stock in trade.4 We reject Henley’s contention that the 
reports—which Douglass found to corroborate her concerns—
provide little to no support for reasonable suspicion in the 
parole context. 
Griffin supports our approach. The Court there found 
“reasonable grounds” for a probation search when a detective 
called a probation supervisor and stated “there were or might 
be guns” in the probationer’s home. 483 U.S. at 871. Nothing 
further to support a search—just an “unverified tip from an 
unknown source” to a detective then relayed to probation. Id. 
at 887 (Blackmun, Jr., dissenting).  
                                                 
4 Samson recognized that a parolee’s incentive to 
conceal criminality justifies an intensive system of 
supervision. 547 U.S. at 855. The delicate balance of this 
system—at the same time seeking a transition into society 
while protecting the public from the same individual—requires 
parole officers to act on “reports,” “tips,” or “information” that 
in other contexts might seem too thin. 
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The Court explained  
we think it reasonable to permit information 
provided by a police officer, whether or not on 
the basis of firsthand knowledge, to support a 
probationer search. . . .[P]olice may be unwilling 
to disclose their confidential sources to probation 
personnel. For the same reason, and also because 
it is the very assumption of the institution of 
probation that the probationer is in need of 
rehabilitation and is more likely than the 
ordinary citizen to violate the law, we think it 
enough if the information provided indicates, as 
it did here, only the likelihood (“had or might 
have guns”) of facts justifying the search. 
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879–80 (1987). Thus, Griffin endorses the 
adequacy of generalized information from an unknown source 
of evidence of a crime in a parole/probation context.  
We also find it significant that the Supreme Court in 
Griffin did not assess traditional tip reliability factors—
presumably because it involved a probationer. In view of 
Henley’s drug trafficking history, the ongoing reports (more 
than the one report in Griffin) would resonate with a reasonable 
parole agent’s concerns about his activities. Under Griffin the 
reports themselves would provide reasonable suspicion for a 
parole search, whether or not relayed through other law 
enforcement.  
Viewing the totality of the facts presented here, 
Henley’s parole status and his criminal history with drugs 
made him more likely to commit a drug trafficking crime than 
the public. He also violated his conditions of parole by failing 
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to ask the permission required of his parole agent. Another 
factor is the apparent disparity in Henley’s income and his 
spending. Douglass learned of Henley’s decreased interest in 
taking on work at MPW at the same time he exhibited an ability 
to pay thousands of dollars in fines and purchase vehicles, 
homes, repairs, and new furniture. All this suggested to 
Douglass that Henley had returned to drug trafficking to make 
money. The smell of a large amount of marijuana and the 
break-in of Henley’s home also suggested an intruder seeking 
to access drugs, guns, and money in Henley’s home. Finally, 
we acknowledge the ongoing reports to Douglass from October 
2013 continuing up until the time of the search that Henley 
engaged in drug trafficking activity and his continued 
association with other parolees suspected of the same. These 
facts ineluctably show that a reasonably prudent parole agent 
in Douglass’s shoes would suspect that Henley returned to drug 
trafficking and that evidence of it would be found during the 
February 23, 2015 search.  
* * * 
The Commonwealth found evidence supporting 
Henley’s conviction during a search supported by reasonable 
suspicion. Because no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, 
the District Court did not err when it denied Henley’s motion 
to suppress. We will affirm the convictions and judgment of 
sentence. 
